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THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE-A LETTER TO A
HOSTILE STUDENT*
Samuel lVIermint
Dear George:
Your letter was depressing. I lmew the high hopes and healthy
interest with which you had approached the study of jurisprudence.
The fact that you have stopped taking the course and hope "to work
out these large questions sometime when law school days are over"
made me wonder about what is wrong with jurisprudence, as well as
whether the course is worth giving at all.
What impels me to write to you now is the hope that I can persuade
you to take the jurisprudence course while you are still in school. I
don't lmow your teacher, but even if he is uninspired and uninformed,
I think the materials available for study will interest you enough to
carry you along-when used in conjunction with the lecture I am about
to throw at you. I'll divide my observations into these categories: (I)
The value of such a course to you as a law student and law graduate;
(II) an introductory analysis designed to help you in your "approach"
towards jurisprudential material, so that you may, for example, be better able to recognize "phony" material when you bump into it; (III) examples from existing jurisprudential literature to illustrate the preceding point; (IV) an indication of the relevance of certain existing
materials to a study of the broad problems involved in jurisprudence.

I
The value to the law student of a course in jurisprudence has long
been a question mark-and to the teachers as well as the students. The
"" The addressee of this letter is a stude_nt, known to the writer, who dropped a jurisprudence course shortly after its commencement. The letter-form has been used both to help
me to use simple language, and to facilitate the use of the article as a meaningful message
to the entering student of jurisprudence that may help him avoid the traditional, bewildered
hostility of such students.
Indeed, the writer proposes to jurisprudence teachers that this letter would be an appropriate first assignment (though for more than one session) in the course-because it sketches
for the student in a relatively simple way (a) the value of the course, (b) a basic oricnta•
tion designed to facilitate analysis and evaluation of jurisprudential writing, (c) an introduction to what is probably the most influential essay in American jurisprudence, (d) examples
of some "don'ts" in jurisprudential writing to watch out for, (e) indications of the type
of materials which are relevant for the study of jurisprudence, and why. To be sure, there
will be some disagreement with my position in one or more of these categories, but that
will give this letter the pedagogical value of a target at which to shoot, at the same time
that it raises questions which in any event should probably be raised at the outset of the
course.
t Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma.-Ed.
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students have not been prompted by self-interest, as the teachers have,
to come up with plausible erasures of the question mark. Most students, as you did, find the course esoteric, murky and impractical. The
teachers, however, many of whom are mercifully unaware of the student reaction, have found sufficient justification for the course on various grounds which I think I can brieB.y summarize.
Jurisprudence shares with other forms of philosophy the so-called··
"integrative" . function. Not long ago, the American Philosophical
Association sponsored a nation-wide survey of opinion in various fields
of endeavor, on the role of philosophy in education and modem life,
and found this function stressed as a distinctive and a vital one. "The
dominant impression is of a great opportunity. In the colleges the defects of the elective system are revealing the ·need for philosophic integration and perspective. Among our graduates, trained in their
various specialties, the sense of living on professional islands is leading
to a general hunger for more means of intellectual intercourse, and for
a body of standards and principles that will make life at once less insular and more humane. And in both groups the decay of traditional
authority is calling for a new measure of individual and responsible
thinking. Hence widespread turning to philosophy of curious, expectant, and even entreating eyes."1
As a law student .(whether or not you have had philosophy courses
in college)· you are not exempt from this need. You have in fact more
things to integrate than does the college student. The whole new
world of torts, crimes, contracts, corporations, easements, wills and the
rest, begs for some unity not only within itself but with the other more
familiar world which as a college student you were struggling to understand. "Nor is there any way out through mechanical arrangements
like the• regrouping of courses, or through technical devices such as predigested textbooks and motion pictures, which facilitate passive absorption. What is needed, it is widely felt, is precisely escape from such
passivity, an inner power and activity that will enable the student to
achieve intellectual synthesis for himself, habits of reB.ection that are
vigorous and assimilative; devices for absorption may only increase the
smothering volume under which the student is already half buried.
Facts, as Maritain says, should be 'actively 'transformed by understand0

· 1 BLANsHAl\D, DacAsss, HENDEL, MURPHY, Orro, PmLosoPHY IN AMEmcAN EnuCA•

117 (1945). :i:,et me apologize at this point for using footnotes in this letter. It is a
disease which I thought I could avoid, but I find that it will make what I have to say. run
more smoothly.
TION
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ing µito the very life of the mind, and thus strengthen the latter, as
wood thrown into fire and transformed into Harne makes the fire
stronger. But a big mass of damp wood thrown into a fire only puts it
out.' Now there ~s.nothing, we have been repeatedly told, that can give
the student so much help in ordering and assimilating his knowledge as
reHection of a philosophic kind. . . ."2
Moreover, an acquaintance with the contrariety of opinion on basic
issues in speculative thought affords opportunity for cultivation of other
important habits of mind and outlook: a fundamental toleration, in the
sense of an appreciation of the validity, within particular limits, of the
varying philosophic perspectives; a critical attitude towards the views
advanced by the Great Names in place of that automatic obeisance
which stems largely from ignorance; an awareness of the paucity of
reliable social knowledge by which to verify any of the conHicting
theories; the self-confidence which comes from the realization that
others have not already pre-empted the field, that fresh answers to the
old questions are still in order.
But "after all is said and done," you will ask, "are the philosophic
exercises of jurisprudence 'practical'?" If this means, will jurisprudence
help you in the science and art of being a lawyer, then certainly the
answer is "yes." Let me explain why.
·
(a) Since philosophical theories have inHuenced the development
of, or are embodied in, the law, it is obvious that a familiarity with them
can help you to understand the law that you learn in law school. Thus,
for instance, in criminal law such matters as the theory of punishment
or the treatment of insanity are better understood when the bearing of
the philosophical issue of free will vs. determinism is made clear. In
constitutional law and in some other fields, many judicial opinionsparticularly of an earlier era-are not fully understood without an appreciation of the "natural law" philosophy.3
Another deepening of the understanding of your law school course
will come from the fact that many basic legal concepts which are utilized over and over again but more or less taken for granted in those
courses, are intensively analyzed in the jurisprudence course (or at least
have been, in some jurisprudence courses). I am thinking of such
concepts as stare decisis, the ratio decidendi of a case, the theory of
statutory construction, analysis of the fundamental theory of contract
2 Id. at 12-13.
3 See cases in HALL,

·
lliw>mcs IN ]UBISPRUDENCB 290-306 (1938); Grant, ''The Natural Law Background of Due Process," 31 CoL. L. RBv. 56 (1931).
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(such as Morris Cohep. and Karl Llewellyn concerned themselves with)
and others. To the extent that analyses such as these were already made
in the law courses themselves, the jurisprudence course would serve as
valuable review. But my experience has been that many students "open
their eyes" in the jurisprudence course, to aspects of the bread-andbutter courses they have been blind to. It is the concentration on basic
theory, which permits an understanding that the substantive-law course
-its teacher hounded by the clock and the 1200 pages of the casebooksometimes fails to elicit. For like reasons I would include materials
(that used to be included in the old~r compilations of readings) giving
a bird's-eye view of fundamental notions of policy in the law-school
fields of tort, contract, crime, property.4
Still another means toward the better understanding of the mate-rials with which lawyers-deal can be contributed by the jurisprudence
course: a training in word-analysis. By this I don't mean to infringe
on courses in legislative draftsmanship, brief-writing, and other courses
designed to impart skills in language facility and felicity. I am thinking
of the kind of training that would make law students allergic to ambiguity and to certain types of futile legal discussions. I have in mind
the type of analysis in which Walter Wheeler.Cook loved to indulge.
It was based on the proposition that "one function of jurisprudence,
or at least of the analytical part of it, is to examine critically the terms
used in the lawyer's statements of his rules and principles, and the concepts for which these terms stand ... to find out whether the conceptual tools the lawyer and the judge are using are adequate to their
needs."5 I expect to say something more of this later, and demonstrate
how the existing literature of jurisprudence itself exhibits too often
the kind of unawareness that Cook was fighting against. I am not too
optimistic, of course, about changing a law student's word-habits by one
portion of one course in his three years of law school. Ideally, all of his
law school courses (not to mention his prior schooling) would pay attention to this aspect of his education. The more the student has been
4 Thus, a second or third-year student who has been grappling with jurisprudence issues
and who then reads the able introductory chapter of Presser's hornbook on torts gets an
illumination of what that field is all about, which he could not get as a first-year student oE
torts. So too, as I shall later indicate, with the readings organized on the basis oE an "interestanalysis," in SIMPSON AND STONE, LAW AND SonETY (1948).
5 Cook, "The Utility of Jurisprudence in the Solution of Legal Problems," in 5 LECTUimS
ON LEGAL TOPICS, Association of the Bar of the City of New York 338 (1924). Cf. HooK,
EDUCATION FOR MoDERN MAN 96 (1946): "The result of thorough training in 'semantic'
analysis-using that term in its broadest sense without invidious distinctions between different
schools-is an intellectual sophistication without which a man may be learned but not
intelligent."
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exposed to it before, the easier will be the task in jurisprudence-but
in any event he should be exposed to it in this course. The danger is in
under-emphasis. Indeed, it may be, as some students of languageanalysis have concluded, that something more than purely verbal training is necessary to attain the necessary mastery over verbalism. 6
(b) If jurisprudence can serve in these ways to foster a better understanding of the materials with which you, as a law student and law
graduate, have to deal, it is reasonable to suppose that it would therefore, in general, increase the proficiency with which you handle those
materials as a law graduate. Obviously, the worker who understands
his tools may be able to do a better job.
(c) But in addition to this generally more intelligent handling of
the materials, there is the fact that your whole "approach" towards a
problem, e.g., the problem of winning a case for a client, may vary
depending upon the particular jurisprudential assumptions you make.
If you have been made vividly aware that things in addition to legal
rules influence judicial decisions, this should lead you to pay attention
to techniques of presentation and persuasion (e.g., skillful shaping of
the statement of facts, studying the personality and past decisions of
the particular judge to see the types of reasoning and rhetoric likely to
persuade him, presenting non-legalistic considerations that are usually
regarded as in the domain of "policy"). So, too, what you conceive to
be a proper theory of stare decisis or of ratio decidendi will influence
the way you prepare your case.
6 "Preliminary investigations in the teaching of language habits of accuracy and proper
evaluation have repeatedly revealed what was at first a curious fact, that talking about the
methods and devices was practically valueless. It was too easy for students to nod their heads,
write essays, and pass examinations on the principles, while again and again manifesting
confusion of the orders of abstracting in the very sentences in which they were writing about
it. There was, we discovered, an enormous difference between being able to talk about these
notions and getting them deep down in the nervous system. • • • Just as it is impossible to
teach swimming or typewriting by verbal means alone, so we cannot expect to teach methods
of evaluation which involve more than verbalizing without some techniques of participation.
Korzybski had come to the same conclusion by August, 1924, when he delivered a paper called
Time-Binding: the General Theory before the International Mathematical Congress in Toronto, Canada. In this he attempted to present visually a diagrammatic structure by means of
which he was able to explain many mechanisms of non-identity and significant discrimination •••• If we analyze only on verbal levels, the non-verbal levels escape attention, so that
we go by words without concern for what they represent. ••. There were ••• three needs to
be met: (1) a way of affecting deeper comprehension of getting to channels in the nervous
system other than the ear (i.e., the eyes, the senses of touch and pressure, etc.); (2) a way
of showing, as well as talking about, the silent levels; and (3) a way of jogging the memory
so that the principles are remembered whenever talk occurs. These needs had been met for
us by the construction of a relief diagram, with detachable parts, which could be seen, pointed
to, and handled. Korzybski calls it the Structural Differential." LBB, LANGUAGE HABITS IN
HUMAN .AFFAIRS 262-4 (1941).
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( d) For you· and for others like you, jurisprudence has another
utility. You once expressed an interest in something other than the
practice of law-such as political office, public administration, or teaching. If you travel that kind of road, certainly the relations of legalistic
"law" with the other social studies become clearly pertinent. In no
course in law school other than jurisprudence will you get a concentrated study of those interrelations.
(e) I think any teacher of jurisprudence who has ever asked and
answered the question, "How practical is jurisprudence?" comes finally
to round out his answer with a snort at the question itself. For jurisprudence is part of that "cultural" tradition which includes the symphony, the novel, etc., in which men lose themselves for the joy, not
the utility of it. Holmes, in a celebrated address, after characterizing
jurisprudence as a "study which sometimes is undervalued by the practical minded" went on to conclude that it had more than "practical"
justification: 'We cannot all be Descartes or Kant, but we all want
happiness. And happiness, I am sure from having known many successful men, cannot be won simply by being counsel for great corporations and having an income of fifty thousand dollars. An intellect great
enough to win the prize needs other food besides success. The remoter
and more general aspects of the law are those which give it universal
interest. It is through them that you not only become a great master
in your calling, but connect your subject with the universe and catch
an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint
of the universal law." 7

II
I said I would try to outline an introductory analysis that might help
you in approaching the study of jurisprudence. From your letter I
gather there were two major things that repelled you: (a) the mystifying jargon and (b) the bewildering variety of "schools" of jurisprudence, which have left you wondering "where the truth lies, and
whether this isn't all just a matter of opinion."
Let me say first that you must not be·over-awed by the jargon. Don't
assume, if you fail to ·understand, that the fault lies in you. After all,
you are a mature person, V\Zith high I.Q. and a willingness to learn.
If, in spite of these things, the language. is not clear, may not the
trouble lie with the writer? All that you can be fairly sure ab01.~t, from
_a book's having been published, is that a publisher thou~ht it would
7 HoLMEs, CoLLECTJ!D l.EcAL PAPl!Rs

167 at 202 (1920).

1950]

STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE

45

sell sufficient copies to make it profitable for him to publish it. One
thing that seems to stimulate the sale of copies is that peculiar profundity which comes from a writer's language obscurity just slightly
beyond the reach of comprehension. (Someone has referred to "the
mystic thrill which comes from apprehension without comprehension.") Don't be fooled by it. Insist that his important concepts be defined clearly and used consistently.8 Insist that he not abuse the concept of definition itself by his argument on the "truth" of his conception of the "nature of law" (of this, more later). Be on guard against
those familiar types of pitfalls which the students of "general semantics" have recently been emphasizing under the concepts of abstracting,
failure to "index," abuse of the verb "to be," etc.9 Remember that, as
8 I am aware that I have not defined all the key terms used in this paper, but that is
because of a belief that whatever misunderstandings may result will not be serious.
O"We waste time looking for but one-and-one-only-'meaning.' Misunderstanding and
confusion arise when readers and listeners assume that their word uses are also the word uses
of writers and speakers." LEE, LANGUAGE HABITS IN HUMAN AFFAIRS 47 (1941).
"We see what we see, but human nervous systems cannot get to 'all' the details of anything. Our speech abstracts some details and neglects others. Partial descriptions must not be
defined as 'complete.' TI1e assumption of 'allness' leads to tension and conllict, the preservation of ignorance, and the blockage of further learning." Id. at 65.
"Our language use too often emphasizes the static. We speak as if life facts were not
changing, as if our statements fit for 'all-time.' The time factor must become a part of human
orientation.'' Id. at 83.
"It is the failure to apply a spectrum analyis to the many different aspects of natural
existence that is our theme. Though the shading off and the uniqueness may be readily seen
and not mistaken when the topic is color, the discrimination often does not come when the
discussion turns to objects, happenings, feelings, persons. We speak of 'sanity and insanity,'
'beauty and ugliness,' 'strength and weakness,' as if these terms were capable of application
without their more or less qualification, without regard for the uniqueness and differences in
the non-verbal world." Id. at 103.
'Within ••• this language pattern come statements of the form, 'Negroes are intellectually inferior to Whites.' This primitive, undiscriminating, unobserving orientation stresses
similar characteristics to the neglect of the indefinitely many-valaed, different 'Negroes' and
'whites' that can be found. The shift from this one-valued to the desirable orientation by
life facts is to be coached by the systematic use of indexes [e.g. Negro1, Negro2, etc.] and
dates.'' Id. at 107.
"Though we. can distinguish in analysis between statements which point to objects,
people and happenings in the outside-of-the-skin-world and those which point to reactions
inside-the-skin, the language habits of men in action do not make such clear distinctions.
The two uses are most often to be found intertwined from sentence to sentence.'' Id. at 147.
"To respond to words as if they were more than symbols of something other is to revert
to the primitive and the infantile. The basic question: not, What was it called, but What
was being so called?" Id. at 172.
"Descriptive terms, because closer to life facts, actional and functional, make verification
and agreement possible. Inferential terms add to the products of direct experience, introducing judgments, conclusions, creeds, theories, etc•••• Confusion of the orders of abstraction
leads to non-adaptive signal reactions, automatic, unconsidered behavior, copying animals in
our responses. Delay of reaction gives time for observation and more human symbol reactions.''
Id. at 204.
"Silence on the objective levels is paralleled by silence in human responses ••• [which]
makes possible consciousness of many details and of the abstracting therefrom, gives time for
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a distinguished scientist recently put it, "Many of the misunderstandings and failures of everyday h:µman relations are to be laid to imprecisions in meanings"; that "the paradoxes of relativity theory were
found to be associated with imprecisions in the meanings of such common-sense words as mass and .length and time.... The physical world
proves too complex to be dealt with by common sense. We are coming
to see that the situation is similar in a much wider setting, as indeed it
would be a miracle if it were not, considering the uncritical and haphazard way in which the whole apparatus of common-sense thinking
has evolved."10
As for your query about "truth," you are raising something that must
be settled at the very outset. I suspect you did not reflect on exactly
what you meant by "truth." Suppose that by a "true" philosophy, you
were referring to that legal philosophy which appealed to you as most
"soul-satisfying," a theory which took account of the "deeper reality"
and "inherent justice" which lie beyond the ephemeral statutes and
opinions of particular times and places.11 There is nothing to stop you
from adopting that road to private "truth." But remember that it is a
private truth-by which I mean that it will get you into difficulties if
you try to persuade others that they should adopt this theory that is so
satisfying to you. Others may not share your soul-stirring vision, will
fail to recognize this Something which lies beyond.
What then is the appropriate means of persuading others? What
standards are accepted in common? They are in general (however much
they may by some people be deviated from in practice, or regarded as
non-exclusive) the standards of observation and experience, experiment, and· logical reasoning. They are central in scientific method.
They are, theoretically, the accepted standards in practical affairs, inmore looking, develops a more critical attitude, and helps to induce delay-of-reaction." Id. at
222.
.
"An object is not a word. An object may be classified in as many ways, by as many
terms as an observer wishes in terms of his interest at a date. When any form of the verb
to be is followed by a· noun the translation 'may be classified as' should serve to prevent the
assumption of 'allness'-that there exist no other modes of classification. Sense impressions
arise as a joint phenomenon of an observer with something observed. 'Qualities' do not exist
in 'things,' though projected there by the implications of a_ny form of the verb to be preceded
or followed by an adjective. The translation 'appears ••• to me' reveals the existence of relations and helps dissolve the confficts which come from ignorance of the projection mechanism."
Id. at 252-3.
10 Bridgman, "The Scientist's Commitment,',. 5 BuLL. A-roM. Ser. 192 at 196
11 Cf. Pollock's remark, "But it is strange how many rational beings believe the

(1949).
ultimate
truths of the universe to be reducible to patterns on a blackboard." 2 Hou,ms-PoLLOCK
LETrERS, Howe ed., 63 (1941).
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eluding the operations of law. Thus as you know, the court is not persuaded by the lawyer's "intuitive" vision of what would constitute justice in the case. The court purports to be interested in "facts" and logical reasoning (relation of principles to facts, and principles to principles-or, more broadly, relation of propositions to propositions).
But that is not all the court is interested in. It has to select the
premises for its reasoning-the general proposition or rule deemed applicable to the "operative facts" in the instant situation, and the proposition stating the "operative facts" in the instant situation. In this selection of premises the judge is consciously and unconsciously influenced
by many factors, not the least of which is his feeling for what would be
a "·JUSt" resu1t. H ere enters the e1ement of e th·1cs, or "va1ues" or the
"ought,"-an element which closely resembles the kind of thing involved in your "private truth," for there is little consensus about the
testing of values. This is not to say that scientific method is completely inapplicable here-for it can be used in the determination of
(or what has been to date, the attempt to determine) the extent to
which particular legal measures will effectuate particular values. In
others words, an "ought'' proposition (such as "contracts which are
found to meet XYZ requirements ought to be enforced by courts") can
be brought down into the realm of science by asking 'WHY?"-and
adding an "if" clause showing direction of the value to a particular purpose (e.g., "if the purpose is to strengthen family relations"). Then the
implied assertion that the judicial enforcement of contracts meeting
XYZ requirements strengthens family relations is in a form which does
not itself stand in the way of some kind of testing. The judicial enforcement of contracts, in this example, we might call the "subject-ought,"
and the strengthening of family relations might be called the "objectought." The technique suggested for transforming an ought proposition into an assertion that the "subject-ought" will effectuate the "object-ought," is obviously liniited to cases where the "subject-ought" does
have an "object-ought." If the "subject-ought" is cherished for no discernible purpose but is a value for "its own sake" (e.g., perhaps "the
greatest good of the greatest number")1 2 then we cannot test it by any
12 There have been many analogous formulations of basic values, some of them not
clearly of the "for its own sake" variety. Note Carl Becker's description of the "primary values
of life" as "intelligence, integrity and good will," in Nnw WBRTIBs FOR OLD, p. xvi (1941),
and Nelles' phraseology which he largely borrowed from Holmes: "Social understanding •••
and power informed by it as well as by sympathy and prudence,'' in Nelles and Mermin,
"Holmes and Labor Law," 13 N.Y. Umv. L.Q. REv. 517 at 555 (1936). One of the most
elaborate recent analyses along these lines by thinkers in the legal field is found in Lasswell
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transformation into a factual ·assertion. It is this kind of "ultimate"
value which is properly referred to when writers put values in a separate domain from facts, and talk about the chasm between the "is"
and the "ought." The chasm has never been bridged in the history of
thought, as far as I can tell. Professor Northrop's declarations in this
•direction seem to require something more in the way of a bill of particulars and proof,1 3 and I think the arguments of Fuller14 and
and McDougal, "L!:!gal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public
Interest," 52 YALE L. J. 203 (1943) where the authors set up the democratic values of
shared power, shared respect (including the respect shown by being given relative freedom
of action and opportunity), shared knowledge· (including knowledge of facts about the
''benevolent potentialities of human nature" and "methods by which distorted personality
growth can be prevented or cured''-demonstrating the "possibility of putting morals into
practice") (p. 225). Some other vlllues included are safety; health; balanced distribution of
income, absence of erratic swings in economic development; access to a reliable body of fact
and comment on which decisions can be made to implement democratic values effectively;
integration of individual personalities so that they are compatible with democratic values;
comfort and convenience; and taste.
Of course a pioneer analysis in this connection is Pound's analysis of individual, public
and social "interests,'' and the law's attempt to effectuate and to harmonize these interests.
See Pound, "Interests 0£ Personality," 28 HARv. L. Rnv. 343, 445 (1915); "A Survey of
Social Interests," 57 HARV, L. REv. 1 (1943); "A Survey of Public Interests,'' 58 HARV, L.
Rnv. 909 (1945), and his much shorter table of basic values, critically analyzed in SToNl!,
THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 36.6-8 (1946). Simpson and Stone have utilized a
similar analysis of interests in their three volumes on LAw AND SoCIETY (1949). Some of the
writers and teachers who have begun using the interest-analysis don't always make clear
(unlike Stone in his treatise, supra) whether the interests they set forth are those which they
think the judges, legislators and administrators (1) are actually effectuating, or (2) are
consciously attempting to effectuate, or (3) ought to be effectuating.
13 In THE LoGic OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HuMANITIBs (1947) and "Jurisprudence
in the Law School Curriculum,'' 1 J. LEGAL Eouc. 482 (1949), Professor Northrop has
argued that while social values or "riorms" cannot be scientifically validated directly, this can
be done indirectly. For the assertions of a natural science philosophy, about man and about
the physical world, can be scientifically verified, and such law as today would "rest upon" or
''be in accord with,'' or "order human beings with respect to one another and nature in the
light of" such a natural science philosophy would be not only "good" law, but be "verified •••
since its basic assumptions are those of mathematical physics, which the physicists have verified by scientific methods••••" ("Jurisprudence in the Law School Curriculum,'' supra, at
485-486). But the vagueness over what constitutes this "accord" between natural science
philosophy and legal -norms (as well as persistence of the logical difficulty .of deducing an
"ought"· from an ."is") shows that some further supplementation of Professor Northrop's
thesis is necessary. And see Benjamin, Book Review, 57 PmLos. REv. 512 (1948).
14 In THE LAW IN QuEsT OF hsELF (1940), Professor Fuller castigates "legal posi•
tivism" for its futile and dangerous attempt to separate the "is" and the "ought,'' claiming that
the two are inextricably interwoven. Thus he says a statute or decision, by ''being re-interpreted" in the light of varioUs interpreters' "oughts,'' ''becomes by imperceptible degrees,
something that it was not originally" (pp. 8-10). All that this amounts to is the point that,
as scientists are well aware, a man's reporting of what he sees is unconsciously affected by the
kind of individual he is, and may even be deliberately colored; and when the reporting
requires not m~ely observation but also analysis (as in determining what the legal rules are
in a specified situation) there is further room for variation based on unconscious or deliberate
"oughts." But isn't the distinction still clear between trying to ascertain an existing rule
(however much the rule may vary with the investigator) and trying to promulgate a rule
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Brecht1 5 constitute not the erection of a l?ridge, but the discovery that
there are trees on each side of the chasm that resemble each other. An
"ought" cannot be logically derived from an "is."10
Thus scientific method has a role to play, though limited, in the
field of "values" or "ethics." And it does so more effectively where (as
is seldom the case) the value is not too vague and it is possible to isolate
the effect of the legal measures taken to effectuate the value in question.
Now the scientific scholar in the field of jurisprudence-unlike the
judge rendering a decision-is not always involved in the domain of
"ought" propositions. He may concern himself solely with factual·
study of the interrelations between the domain of legislation, decisions,
regulations, judges, lawyers and officials, on the one hand, and the
domain of other studies devoted to the human scene on the other (including the various "social sciences," and the realm of word-manipulation). Such studies, one hopes, will enable him among other things
to make more intelligent answers to the ought-questions, such as, how
ought a judge to go about deciding a case, what measures ought a legislature to take to accomplish a given result, what results ought to be
posited as worthy of accomplishment (e.g., viewed in the light of what
particular groups seem to desire as ends). He may give separate study
which may or may not exist but which the promulgator thinks is an ethically proper rule'?
Obviously there are some connections between the two endeavors. But the two are clearly
not identical. If an analytical separation can prove useful in terms of more effective results
of factual research on the one hand and ethical thinking on the other ( with the latter making
use of the former) the separation has justified itself.
·
15 Like Fuller, Brecht has pointed out some connection between the two endeavors.
After conceding it to be "a truism of formal logic t!Jat deductive conclusions of the oughtform cannot be drawn solely from premises of the is-form, but only from two premises one of
which also has the ought form," he points out that there is a non-logical bridge between the
"is" and the "ought." "Thus it is a factual statement • • • that f~eling some specific requiredness as an ought is part of our human equipment. This urge, this demand, this ought, whatever its value and validity, is a factum, a datum, found in the world of is. •• _ Here is the
bridge, or one bridge between is and ought• ••• There are certain minimum requirements of
justice which we, as individuals, regard as indispensable••••" Brecht, "The Myth of Is and
Ought," 54 HARv. L. REv.. 811, 812, 829-830 (1941). Thus he is suggesting that·an objective or scientific system of values can be arrived at by examining (largely by introspection)
as an is, the oughts which human beings in fact feel. But not only are these oughts highly
variable with time and place, but the examination, if accurate, will merely tell you wbat
humans in fact feel about oughts; it will not tell you whether all, or which if any, of those
oughts, should be embodied in the statutes and decisions. There is indeed a "factual link,"
but no bridge. It may be conceded that what humans in fact feel about oughts is a weighty
factor to be considered by judges, legislators and administrators.
lO "The real issue is not whether factual knowledge is necessary for a moral judgment
but whether it is sufficient without a distinctly ethical premise. Can we from a number of
premises which describe what is deduce a conclusion which prescribes what ought to be'?
Reflection shows this to be logically impossible and morally confusing." M. R. CoHEN,
REAsoN AND I.Aw 179 (1950).
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to these ought-questions (or he may leave that to others) but a substantial part of his time goes to applying scientific method, as best he
can, in a factual study.
Not that scientific method is ·purely a matter of facts and logic. You
are already aware, I am sure, that various factors in the heredity and
environment of the individual scientist determine which facts he selects
out of the total, and which hypotheses suggest themselves as explaining
the facts or as requiring a search for particular facts. These hypotheses
have in,deed been described as "leaps in the dark," ''brilliant guesses,"
exercises in "scientific imagination." And, of course, they are tentative
-constantly subject to change when further facts seem to require it.
There are other things, too, that belie the layman's notion of rigidity
and certainty in scientific method.17
Why, then, should scientific method be preferred? My own view
of its preferability-and I think the view of those scientists who have
not made a religion of science-is simply that, ~th all the uncertainties in which it abounds, it has worked more successfully than any
other for understanding and controlling the non-human world. It is
· · "facts" and"causes," wh en sotrue that the problem of ascertammg
cieties of human beings are included in the area under analysis, becomes enormously more complicated. "Social facts" are less repeatable,
less isolatable, less experimentable; the complexity of hu11'{,an responses
to things, to people, and to symbols is well known. But a successful
17 Eg., (1) logicians tell us that although inconsistency among the postulates or hypothetical propositions can be detected (i.e., if by applying logical rules of deduction to them,
one can get a conclusion A and also a conclusion not-A, contradictory to the first conclusion)
there is no known means of prO'Ving consistency in advance. The fact that we have not yet
arrived at contradictory conclusions from Euclid's postulates doesn't pr01Je his system is consistent. (2) The rules governing deductions from the hypothetical premises are variable
(there are numerous different systems of logic and mathematics) and in addition there is
always the possibility of error _being committed within the particular system. (3) The technique of verifying a deduced ~onclusion (theory) by resort to the facts, sometimes runs into
the difficulty that more than one theory can claim such verification. ( 4) Scientists have sometimes found it impossible to perform the necessary observation or experiment needed for verification. (5) It may be difficult or impossible at times to obtain general agreement on the
"facts" shown by observation, experience and experiment. (6) Some scientists have come
to doubt that the basic principle of causality operates with unfailing regularity and in all
realms of nature. See Berenda, "A Five-fold Skepticism in Logical Empiricism," 17 PmLos.
Scr. 123 (1950).
It is also true that in one domain of science-pure mathematics and formal logic-ther~
is a deliberate and consistent divorcement from the observable world. There is an exploration of the logical relations between propositions expressed in symbols that are devised without
reference to known facts. The pure mathematician, as Bertrand Russell has said, literally
doesn't know what he is talking about. But this does not represent a qualification or inconsistency in scientific method. This is an intensive exploration of the field of "logic" referred
to above as one of the elements of scientific method.
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method in natural science is worth trying here to the fullest extent possible. And after all, given the necessity of human communicability, is
the "private truth" alternative any alternative at all? What we must
first be content with in social studies is "knowledge moving carefully
and cannily toward the scientific pole, accompanied by some rough indication of its present latitude. That is the scientific road toward
Science. And progress on that road is valuable, step by step."18
I think we can now answer specifically the questions you raised as
to the "truth" of the various jurisprudential theories, and whether they
are just "a matter of opinion." In the initial approach you take to the
subject-i.e., in determining whether your standard for "truth" is what
I have called "private" or "public"-it is indeed a "matter of opinion."
That is to say, you are free ( within the limits imposed by your heredity
and environment) to choose your standards without fear of being accused of choosing erroneous ones. (A statement of what "truth"
means to you can be neither a true nor false assertion about what it
means or should mean to others.) But once the way of science has
been chosen, then the various theories are no longer just a "matter of
opinion." You have chosen your standards and. you must apply them.
Thus in the light of these standards a theory becomes subject to legitimate criticism when its language (I) does not stick as closely as possible to the observable world of facts and performable operations1 9 or
(2) violates the accepted rules of logical deduction. You will find many
theorists subject to legitimate criticism because while professing to be
followers of scientific method they have notably been guilty of the
first-mentioned deviation. They have smuggled the fruits of a "private
truth" approach into their scientific analysis-and not, as may legitimately be done in science, by means of an "intuitively" or "imaginatively" born hypothesis which is then subjected to factual verification
but by using basic concepts so far removed from the life-facts that the
things they supposedly refer to cannot be agreed upon in common. 20
18 Llewellyn, "The Theory of Legal Science," 20 N.C.L.
19 Cf. "We must think things not words, or at least we

R:sv. 1 at 22 (1941).
must constantly translate our
words into the facts for which they stand. • • ." HoLMEs, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPBRS 238
(1920).
20 See, e.g., Fuller's invoking the standard of being "closer to the inner essence of
things" in THE LAw IN QUEST oP lTsBLP 121 (1940); and second paragraph of note 44,
infra. As an example of obfuscating language which cannot serve as the basis for a common
understanding, take the following from GtmVITcH, SOCIOLOGY oP LAw 308 (1942): "What
are the tasks and the role of the philosophy of law so conceived? Its first task is to lead back
from constructed and symbolic jural experience to immediate jural experience in its various
layers. In actualizing step by step the immediate jural data by means of reflection, data
which are hidden from us by concepts, patterns, symbols and behaviors (the point of depar-
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And remember this too: If the standards you have selected are not
the same as those of your opponent in argument, it is folly to carry on
any argument It is as though you and he were filing your briefs in
different courts. Make sure before engaging in dispute that you and he
have chosen the same standards for resolving the dispute; if you haven't
you will talk endlessly at cross-purposes. Knowing whether to argue
is as important as knowing what to argue.
This is enough, I think, by way of basic approach. The only other
thing I want to do in this introductory analysis is to point to some basic
trends in modem jurisprudential thinking, primarily by calling to your
attention an qddress made by Holmes in 1897 which is probably the
most seminal work in American jurisprudence. I think there is little
in the way of basic ideas in the so-called "realist" group of thinkers that
cannot be found in this speech, entitled "The Path of the Law."21 You
will certainly want to read it yourself, and more than once. But my
sifting out some basic ideas from it may serve as a quick introduction to
some key points of current controversy and will also be useful as background material for the next succeeding section of this letter.
The first noteworthy idea is that Holmes' definitions of "law" and
"duty" showed a desire to get away from abstractions and give primary
attention to the more concrete and observable matters of human behavior-the behavior of judges and how that impinges upon the behavior of others. Thus in defining "law" he scoffed at i1?,e text-writers
who called it "a system of reason"· or a "deduction from principles of
ethics, or admitted axioms or what not," and instead he offered this
celebrated definition: "The-prophecies of what the courts will do in
fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."22
Note that he was referring to what the courts did rather than what they
said; and that his reference to "prophecies" emphasized the uncertainty
ture), the philosophy of law has as a second task, the pointing out of the specific nature of
jural experience as contrasted with other kinds of integral experience: moral, religious, aesthetic, intellectual. The third task of the philosophy of law is to· distinguish, within jural
values which have really been grasp~d or embodied, between illusions-subjective projections
of the collective mentality and objectively valid ideal structures. The method to accomplish
this task is finding the indispensable place of the concrete jural values in the image of the
whole of justice, in which they, when objective, complement each other by constituting a
plurality within a unity."
·
21 HoLMEs, CoLLBCTED LEGAL PAPERS
22 Id. at 173.
.

167 (1920).
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in the legal process.. The definition of legal duty was analogous. 23 Note
further that this type of definition of legal duty was part of a general
desire to distinguish between law and morals in order that legal concepts be "more precise." For the purpose of "learning and understanding the law" he asked his hearers "for the moment to imagine yourselves indifferent" to moral aspects; "the law is full of phraseology
drawn from morals, and by the mere force of language continually invites us to pass from one domain to the other without perceiving it, as
we are sure to do unless we have the boundary constantly before our
minds." He was, thus, vitally concerned with "the trap which legal
language lays for us."24
A second influential notion was the proposition that in the judicial
process, logic plays a secondary role; that the major determinants of
decision are such things as policy considerations, the "felt necessities of
the time," prevailing values, even individual prejudices. "The language
of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic. And the logical
method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which
is in every human mind. But certainty generally is illusion, and repose
is not the destiny of man. Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to
the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds,
often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the
very root and nerve of the whole proceeding. You can give any conclusion a logical form. You always can imply a condition in a contract.
But why do you imply it? It is because of some belief as to the practice
of the community, or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy,
or, in short, because of some attitude of yours upon a matter not capable
of exact quantitative measurement, and therefore not capable of founding exact logical conclusions."2 is
23 ''The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay
·damages if you do not keep it-and nothing else. If you commit a tort, you are liable to pay
a compensatory sum. If you commit a contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum
unless the ·promised event comes to pass,-and that is all the difference." Id. at 175. At
another point he says, "You see how the vague circumference of the notion of duty shrinks
and at the same time grows more precise when we wash it with cynical acid and expel everything except the object of our study, the operation of the law." Id. at 174.
24Id. at 170, 171, 174, 179 (italics added). Note also this theory of contract at 178:
" ••• the making of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention,
but on the agreement of two sets of external signs-not on the parties' having meant the same
thing but on their having said the same thing.•••"
25 Id. at 181. So too he says (at 182): ''Why is a false and injurious statement privileged, if it is made honestly in giving information about a servant. It is because it has been
thought more important that information should be freely given, than that a man should be
protected from what under other circumstances would be an actionable wrong. Why is a
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Turning now from the question of how judges do decide cases to
the question of how they ought to decide them, Holmes emphasized that
they must not merely rely on past history for guidance26 (nor, as he
argued in an essay some years later, can "natural law" be depended
upc,m) 27 but rather that the judge's "inarticulate major premises" should
be made articulate; he should try to bring his policy considerations out
into the open and frankly weigh the social effects of alternative rules.
"I think the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their
duty of weighing considerations of social advantage. The duty is inevitable, and the result of the often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal
with such considerations is simply to leave the .very ground and foundation of judgments inarticulate, and often unconscious, as I have said."28
The judge must be ever conscious that the law exists not for itself but to
serve human ends. The law is "more rational and more civilized when
every rule it contains is referred articulately and definitely to an end
which it subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that end are
stated or are ready to be stated in words." 29
man at liberty to set up a business which he knows would ruin his neighbor? It is because
the public good is supposed to be best subserved by free competition. Obviously such judgments of relative importance may vary in different times and places."
He had previously said on the first page of THE Col\IMON I.Aw (1881): "The life of
the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious,
even the prejudices which judges share .with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more
to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.''
Later, dissenting in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 at 76, 25 S.Ct. 539 (1905), he
observed, "General propositons do not decide concrete cases. The decision will depend on a
judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise.''
2 6 "History must be a part of the study, because without it we cannot know the precise
scope of rules which it is our business to know. It is a part of the rational study, because it
is the first step towards an enlightened skepticism, that is, towards a deliberate reconsideration of the worth of those rules •••. It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from
blind imitation of the past.'' HOLMES, CoLLECT.IID LEGAL PAPERS 186-7 (1920).
27 Id. at 310~312: "It is not enough for the knight of romance that you agree that his
lady is a very nice girl-if you do not admit that she is the best that God ever made or will
make, you must fight. There is in all men a demand for the superlative, so much so that
the poor devil who has no other way of reaching it attains it by getting drunk. It seems to me
that this demand is at the bottom of the philosopher's effort to prove that truth is absolute
and of the jurist's search for criteria of universal validity which he collects under the head of·
natural law. . . . certitude is not the test of certainty. We have been cock-sure of many
things that were not so.••• The jurists who believe in natural law.seem to me to be in the
naive state of mind that accepts what has been familiar and accepted by them and their neighbors as something that must be accepted by all men everywhere.''
2s Id. at 184.
29 Id. at 186. Note this, however, in "Law in Science and Science in Law," id. at 210,
239: "I do not expect or think it desirable that the judges should undertake to renovate the
law. That is not their province. Indeed precisely because I believe that the world would
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Further, Holmes realized that in order to make this ideal effective,
an enormous amount of social research was necessary: research that
would indicate the social effects of an existing legal rule as well as the
probable effects of an alternative rule being considered as a substitute.
"For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man
of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the
master of economics."30
Finally the task of research is to concern itself not only with the
extent to which particular rules serve particular ends, but study of the
ends themselves. "I look forward to a time when . . . we shall spend
our energy on a study of the ends sought to be attained and the reasons
for desiring them." 31
Perhaps I have gone into "The Path of the Law" in too much detail.
But the analysis and program it embodies has so shaped the course of
jurisprudential controversy in America, and is so graciously expressed,
that I can think of no better introduction and stimulus to the student
who is just getting his feet wet in this field.

III
Now for some illustrations of the type of thing, in jurisprudential
writing, against which the introductory analysis I have given you should
put you on your guard.
Let me begin with definition-battles. You will find thousands of
pages written on the question of "what is law?" And the fact that this
is not a dead issue is illustrated by the recent appearance of Jerome
be just as well off if it lived under laws that differed from ours in many ways, and because I
believe that the claim of our especial code to respect is simply that it exists, that it is the one
to which we have become accustomed, and not that it represents an eternal principle, I am
slow to consent to overruling a precedent, and think that our important duty is to see that
the judicial duel shall be fought out in the accustomed way. But I think it most important
to remember whenever a doubtful case arises, with certain analogies on one side and other
analogies on the other, that what really is before us is a conflict between two social desires,
each of which seeks to extend its dominion over the case, and which cannot both have their
way. The social question is which desire is stronger at the point of conflict. The judicial
one may be narrower, because one or the other desire may have been expressed in previous
decisions to such an extent that logic requires us to assume it to preponderate in the one
before us. But if that be clearly so, the case is not a doubtful one. Where there is doubt the
simple tool of logic does not suffice, and even if it is disguised and unconscious, the judges
are called on to exercise the sovereign prerogative of choice." Note also this observation in
his dissent in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 at 221, 37 S.Ct. 524 (1917):
"I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only
interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions. A common-law judge could
not say I think the doctrine of consideration a bit of historical nonsense and shall not enforce
it in my court."
30 HOLMES, CoLLl!CTI!D LEGAL PAPERS 187 (1920).
s1 Id. at 195.
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Hall's article, "Concerning the Nature of Positive Law."32 The question, "What is posif;ive law" may be usefully analyzed, I think, by
changing the order of words so that the sentence reads, "Positive law is
33
-----."
Now it has often been remarked that the word "law"
or the phrase "positive law" is ambiguous; it has many meanings. But
it is not so ofo~n realized that this very form of definitional statement
is also ambiguous. We must, in other words, be concerned not only
with the meaning of law but with the "meaning of meaning'': What
is the meaning of the definition? That is, what relations are we trying
to refer to when we fill in the blank in the definitional statement "Positive law is-----"?
We evidently are not trying to state a relation of identity between
the "positive law" verbal phrase itself and the matter in the predicate.
A verbal phrase is not the same as statutes, decisions, etc.
l. But we may be trying to say tl1at an "inherent," one-and-only
"essence" of the verbal phrase is that stated in the predicate. This cannot, however, be what the follower of scientific method is trying to
say. The intuitive finding of "inherent" essences in words probably has
its roots in primitive magic.34 At any rate it is, to use a phrase in the
58 YALE L. J. 545 (1949).
For an intensive analysis of this view of a question as a "propositional function," see
F. S. Cohen, "What is a Question," 39 MoNisT 350 (1929).
34 "The most definite form which a belief in the power of words has taken is in the
special field of magic, Whether regarded as mysteriously evolved from Nature in the beginning of time, as the Breath of Omnipotence taking mundane form, as the Mind of divinity
in its material aspect, or vaguely as.the Souls and essences of things and persons, sacred words
have always had a special place in the.practice of magic•••• As a rule the words enjoy an
independent existence, so that Arabs, when being cursed, will lie on the ground to let the
curse Hy over them•••• The Magic of Names is often potent where we should least expect
it, and the distress of Sachs on the discovery of Uranus, which found expression in his
query-'What guarantee have we that the planet regarded by astronomers as Uranus is really
Uranus?'-is only one degree more primitive than Herbert Spencer's contention that 'By comparing its meanings in different connections, and observing what they have in common, we
learn the essential meaning of a word • • • let us thus ascertain the meaning of the words
"good,'' ' etc.
"The italics are ours, and no one who does not believe with Nansen's Greenland
Eskimos 'that there is a spiritual affinity between two people of the same name,' can fail to
see the futility of such attempts to define by Essence. The doctrine derives from the view
already referred to that words are in some way parts of things (a charge which Spencer himself, curiously enough, brings elsewhere against Greek speculation in general). If, as was
supposed everything has its proper name, the existence of a name enables us to look with
confidence for the thing or 'idea' to which it belongs, and, in general, things possessing the
same name will have something in common which the process 0£ definition must endeavour
to find....
.
" ••• the curious instinctive tendency to believe that a word has its own true or proper
use, which we have seen has its roots in magic, too often prevents this ability to produce
definitions from taking effect." OGDEN AND RICHAllDs, nm Ml?ANmo oP Ml?ANmo, 1st ed.,
68, 207, 225 (1923).
82
83
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analysis pre~ously set forth, a project for the seeker of "private truth."
What seems inherent to A may not seem inherent to B. The scientist
may find, fro:qi factual investigation that a verbal phrase has been given
the same meaning or reference by all or nearly all the people in a large
group, but that is clearly different from envisioning an "inherent"
meaning.
2. This brings us to a second possibility. We may be trying to say
that the verbal phrase being defined (hereafter referred to as the definiendum) was, or is, in fact understood by a substantial group of people
to be referring to the matters in the predicate (hereafter referred to as
the definiens). This is the "conventional" or dictionary-type definition.
And a good dictionary-type definition will give more than one definiens,
where the understanding differed with different groups (e.g., different
in occupational classification, in time, or in place). This type of definition can be true or false, depending on whether it accurately reflects the
understanding in question. 35
3. We may be trying to say that the definiendum is understood by
the user thereof to refer to the matters in the definiens-irrespective of
the sense in which other people might normally use the phrase in the
definiendum. Here the user of the phrase may try to put into the
definiens, that which corresponds closely to some generally understood
view of the verbal phrase being defined..:..but he is not controlled by that
general understanding, and draws the boundaries of the predicate in
the light of what is most useful for him in communicating his ideas
clearly. The definiendum being merely a shorthand name for the
definiens is intended to be neutral in its flavor or connotation. It is as
though the definer were saying, "Whenever I use the word "XYZ" in
the following discourse, this is what I mean by it, and don't read anything else into it." This type of definition can be neither true· nor false;
it makes no assertion of fact. 36 .
85 Note

this statement from CoHEN AND NAGEL, INntonoCTioN TO Lome AND SCIEN·
31 (1934): "The intension of a term may signify the set of attributes which
are essential to it. And by 'essential' we mean the necessary and sufficient condition for
regarding any object as an element of the term. This condition is generally selected by some
convention, so that intension in this sense is called conventional intension or connotation.
The conventional intension of a term .•• constitutes its definition." (Italics supplied in last
sentence.)
BG The type 3 definition is the type Felix Cohen has in mind when (in an article which
I would prescribe as a "must") he says, after quoting Holmes' definition of "law," "A good
deal of fruitless controversy has arisen out of attempts to show that this definition of law as
the way courts actually decide cases is either true or false. A definition of law is useful or
useless. It is not true or false, any more than a New Year's resolution or an insurance policy.
A definition is in fact a type of insurance against certain risks of confusion. It cannot, any
nFIC METHOD
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4. We may be trying to saY. that the definiendum symbolizes
immediately (that is, before you get to the definiens) an agreed thing
or class of things whose "essential" (in the sense of differentiating)
characteristics are stated in the de-finiens. Thus, when we say, "a steam
engine is - - - , " we have a clear idea of the object to which the
definiendum refers before we even get to the definiens. And that
definiens may be devoted to description of those characteristics (in
terms of wheels, steam, etc.) which are deemed to differentiate it from
other objects. The definiens, of course, does not tell all about the thing
in question; some characteristics are abstracted on the basis of which it
is placed in one or more classifications in the definiens. Another illustration of this type of definition is, "Man is a rational animal." In other
words, it may be said that this type of definition is primarily de-fining
a "thing" rather than a word.37 The definition can-he true or false,
depending on whether t4e characteristics stated of the thing in question
can be empirically verified and its usefulness will depend largely on the
extent to which the description in fact differentiates the thing from
other objects.
The vital aspect of this type of definition is that the definiendum
immediately symbolizes an agreed entity. This will generally be an
agreed material object, simply because it is overwhelmingly easier to
have agreement ( on what it is that is immediately symbolized by the
more than can a commercial insurance policy, eliminate all risks. Absolute certainty is as
foreign to language as to life. There is no final insurance against an insurer's insolvency.
And the words of a definition always carry their own aura of ambiguity. But a definition is
useful if it insures against risks of confusion more serious than any that the definition itself
contains•••• [The] sources of ambiguity in Holmes' definition of law are peripheral rather
than central, and easily remedied. They are, therefore, far less dangerous sources of confusion
than the basic ambiguity inherent in classical definitions of law which involve a confusion
between what is and what ought to be. • • • The confusion and ambiguity. which infest the
classical conception of law, as formulated by Blackstone and implicitly accepted by most
modern legal writers, arise from the attempt to throw together two inconsistent ideas. Blackstone attempts in effect to superimpose the picture of law drawn by the tender-minded
hypocrite, Coke, upon the picture executed by the tough-minded cynic, Hobbes, and to give
us a composite photograph. Law, says Blackstone, is 'a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the
supreme power in a State (Hobbes speaking) commanding what is right and prohibiting
what is wrong (Coke speaking)' •••• Those theorists who adhere to the Blackstonian definition of law are able to spin legal theories to the heart's content without fear of refutation. I£
legislatures or courts disagree with a given theory, it is a simple matter to show that this disagreement is unjust, unreasonable, monstrous and, therefore, not 'sound law.' On the other
hand, the intruding moralist who objects to a legal doctrine on the ground that it is unjust
or undesirable can be told to go back to the realm of morality he came from, since the law is
the command of the sovereign and not a matter of moral theory. Perhaps the chief usefulness
of the Blackstonian theory is the gag it places upon legal criticism••• .'' Cohen, "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach," 35 CoL. L. RBv. 809 at 829, 835-6, 838
(1935).
87 See

the quotation from

0GDBN AND RicHARDs,

infra note 39.
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definiendum) in the case of material things than in the case of other
entities.
5. . We may be trying to say simply that the definiendum refers to
the differentiating characteristics stated in the defini€;ns-the difference
from #4 above being, that the definiendum does not immediately symbolize an agreed entity before you get to the characteristics stated in the
definiens. The definiendum seems to represent some vague entity or
feeling about an entity, which the writer tries to clarify by searching for
those essential characteristics (of X) which best "fit" the feeling of
visualized entity. Or he may have no such feeling of vagueness, and
may assume mistakenly, that the clarity with which he visualizes the
entity symbolized by the definiendum is a common, ·shared clarity. In
either case he assumes that this feeling or entity is something as to
which a factual description can. be verified, in common-i.e., that it is
the kind of agreed entity described in #4 above. 38 At least that is so
when the maker of this kind of definition claims it to be "true." Definitions of abstractions, such as "philosophy," "ethics," "law," are often
of this type (though they need not be, since type 2 or 3 could properly
be used). They are not making assertions about the characteristics of
an agreed entity, as in type 4, or about the understanding that some
38 And often the erroneous assumption is that this entity is a material entity. See Woodard's discussion of "reification" in LEE, THE LANGUAGE OF WxsnoM AND FoLLY 214-220
(1949). Note generally the following observation of Pareto: "In the logico-experimental
sciences, given the thing one may select the name for it quite arbitrarily•••• In the non-logicoexperirnental sciences, the name is usually giyen, and one goes looking for a thing to which
the sentiments that the name arouses will correspond.•••" 4 PARETO, THE l\1IND AND
SocrETY, Livingston ed., 1929 (1935). An earlier observation of his is also instructive: "If
their [economists] arguments partook of experimental science, they would continue to hold
even if blanks were used for the terms 'value' and 'capital'; for the name being taken away,
the things still stand, and it is in things alone that experimental science is interested .••• Anyone asking what value is, what capital is, what income is, and the like, shows by that mere fact
that he is concerned primarily with words and secondarily with things. The word 'capital' certainly exists for him. What he is in doubt about is what it means, and he sets out to discover
that. This procedure might be justifiable on a reasoning developed as follows: 'There is something unknown that acts upon language and gives rise to the word "capital." Since ordinary
words are exact copies of the things they represent, we can understand the thing by studying
the word. So by finding out what capital is, we shall come to know the thing unknown.' The
fallacy in the justification lies in the proposition italicized. It is false. For more convincing
proof one need simply substitute for the term 'capital' some scientific term such as 'water,' and
see whether the most painstaking inquiry as to what it is that is called water will ever reveal
the properties of the chemically pure substance known by that name.
"In science the course followed is the exact opposite: first one examines the thing and
and then hunts up a name to give it. First one considers the substance formed by combining
oxygen and hydrogen, and then a term is sought to designate it. Since the substance in question is present in great quantities in the vaguely defined thing that the ordinary vernacular
designates as water, we call it water. But it might have been called otherwise-'lavoisier,' for
instance-and all of chemistry would stand exactly as it is." 1 PARETO at 62-63. See also
note 34 supra.

·60

MicmcAN LAw R.Evmw.

[ Vol. 49

group of people has about the meaning of the word, as in type 3, nor
are they merely stipulating a convenient, substitute-symbol, as in type 2.
They are ·an illusory application of a type 4 definition-illusory because
applied to a subject-matter unsuited to that type of definition. Evidently, such a definition is neither true nor false.
6. We may be trying to say that the definiens "denotes" one or
more examples of that to which the definiendum refers and to which
there is otherwise no link with an agreed entity. Thus, Euthyphro,
when asked to define "piety," says, "Piety is as I am doing; that is to
say prosecuting anyone who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any other
similar crime." . . . Socrates ( who evidently had in mind either a
type #2 or #5 definition) replies, "Remember that I did not ask you
to give me two or three examples of piety, but to explain the general
idea which makes all pious things to be pious."30 This way of defining
by pointing out examples has been referred to by some logicians as an
"ostensive" definition.
so 2 PLATO, THB DIALOGUES, Jowett trans., p. 79 (1892) as quoted in CoHEN AND
NAGEL, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC AND SCIENTIPIC METHOD 227 (1934).
I have tried to avoid technical terminology, because consultation with some texts on logic
revealed that language with certain connotations in the field of metaphysics has been used by
logicians for some of the above types of definitions. Thus, type 3 would apparently be called
a "nominal" (CoHEN AND NAGEL, 228-9) or "verbal"· [BunTT, PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS
OP RmHT THINKING 546-550 (1946)] definition, whereas type 4 would be a "real'.' definition.
(COHEN AND NAGEL, at 230; BURTT, at 550-552).
As for type 5, it may be that Burtt would classify some examples of my type 5 as "real."
He says (p. 551) "real definitions are only possible in the case of words referring to facts •••"
then gives as an example, the word "nausea" (defined as "sickness of the stomach with a
desire to vomit"). Even if "nausea" be regarded as immediately symbolizing an agreed
feeling, may there not be other verbal abstractions that are describable by. "referring to facts,"
but which nevertheless do not immediately symbolize an agreed entity? A more rigid separation of types 4 and 5 is in BENNETT AND BAYLISS, FORMAL LoCic 238 (1939): "Definitions
of symbols are called verbal definitions: definitions of other entities are said to be real definitions" (evidently the reference to "other entities" is to material entities). A similar separation is in Ogden and Richards who say, "When we define words we take another set of words
which may be used with the same referent as the first, i.e., we substitute a symbol which will
be better understood in a given situation. With things, on the other hand, no such substitution is involved. A so-called definition of a horse as opposed to the definition of tl1e word
'horse,' is a statement about it enumerating properties by means of which it may be compared
with and distinguished from other things. There is thus no rivalry between 'verbal' and 'real' .
definitions." OGDEN AND RrcHARDs, MEANING OP MEANING, 3d ed., 110 (1930). .Cohen
and Nagel however would go in the opposite direction and further than does Burtt. They
would apparently include at least part and perhaps all of my type 5 as constituting perfectly
proper "real" definitions, i.e., even where the abstraction being defined immediately symbolized certain acts only in "a rough way." Thus (at p. 230): "Both Socrates and his friend
knew, in a rough way, what 'piety' was. They understood, that is, to what sort of acts the
term could be applied correctly. But in seeking for a definition of 'piety,' Socrates was searching for an analysis of that which the term represented. • • • Like a nominal definition, this
real definition ["piety is that which is dear to the Gods"] defines the word 'piety' by means of
an equivalent group of words. But, and this is the important point, the definiens is an analysis
of the idea, form, type, or universal symbolized by 'piety.' Both the definiens and the definien-
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Putting it now in summary fashion, words are used as symbols for
something else. That something else may be an agreed entity or it may
not. (I) When the something else is an agreed entity, a definition lends
itself readily to factual verification (assuming the definition itself uses
words that are unambiguous). When-as will generally be the case
where there is such agreement-it is a material object, people other than
the definer are able to look at or otherwise apprehend by the senses the
same thing, to see whether the factual assertions made about its differentiating characteristics are accurate. In analogous fashion, ·where a
non-material object is symbolized by the definiendum, with the same
kind of common agreement as a material object-though this would be
rare-verification in common of the characteristics of the entity agreed
upon in common is possible. The definiens constitutes an equivalent
which is given to the definiendum by verifiable fact-description of the
agreed entity (type 4 above). (2) When the definiendum is a symbol
for an unagreed entity, the equivalent of the definiendum may be (a)
given to it by an unverifiable fact-description of the unagreed entity
(type 5 above); or ·(b) given to it by usage (type 2 above); or (c)
given to it by stipulation (type 3 above).
Or the definiens may be viewed as constituting not an equivalent
which is "given" to the definiendum in accordance with some standard
or purpose, but one which is (d) intuitively "found" to be contained in,
inherent in the definiendum (type l above), or it may not be stated
as an equivalent at all, but as (e) merely an example (type 6 above).
Needless to say, whatever type of definition is used, clarity of discourse
will be furthered to the extent that the definiens is phrased in terms
that have clear reference to verifiable experience.
Still another, and simpler, summary would be as follows: (I) inherent essence, (2) usage, (3) stipulation, ( 4) description of agreed
entity, (5) attempted description of unagreed entity, (6) example.
Now what I want to emphasize is that these different possible purposes (and more could doubtless be thought of) of a definitional stat~
ment are not commonly distinguished by the makers of definitions or
the readers thereof, with a resulting thwarting of clear communication.
Take the recent article of Professor Hall that I referred to pr~
dum refer to the same thing or character. They each possess a meaning independently of the
process of definition which equates them. The definiens, however, indicates the structure of
that to which both refer."
Let me repeat that the failure to separate rigidly type 4 (description of agreed entity)
from type 5 (description of unagreed entity) and to recognize the hodge-podge confusion
involved in the latter is responsible for much bitter and needless controversy.
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viously.40 The article attacks the "Legal Positivists" for defining law in
terms of commands or "power norms." This view is said to be erroneous,
apparently because it fails to take account of positive law as part of a
particular and changing cultural environment and embodying values
as well as facts. We must instead "discover the theory which is most
responsive to the soundly distinguished facts and qualities of all the
power norms known to us-a qualitative, historical estimate," (p. 564)
by which law can be viewed "as an actual entity in social life, as cultural
fact, as a kind of factual-value experience." (p. 565) Also, the "nature
of positive law can only be the common core of all the specific positive
laws, of certain actual entities." (p. 548) "The problem, at bottom,
concerns the 'essence' of positive law and so raises one of the pernianent problems of philosophic thought. The scholastics, elaborating
Aristotle, probed its meaning in detail. ... [T]he definition of positive
law is not a merely conventional question, a matter of laissez-faire....
[T]he least that must be recognized by those who think positive law
refers to some sort of existing entity is that the nature of that entity is
not a matter of individual preference" (p. 546), for "the common· sense
view is that so far as an inquiry is empirical, the definitions used must
represent the facts. This approach cannot be dismissed as the common
man's na'ivete. When a scientist defines his terms, he, too, implies
that his definitions are descriptive. There is, accordingly, a tentativeness regarding his definitions since his knowledge of the facts is limited
and changing. But he certainly intends to represent the existing knowledge in his definitions. His definitions can therefore be challenged as
incorrect or inadequate representations of the facts. This same responsibilitv to the relevant facts should also characterize the definition of
positi~e law." (p. 545)
There are, I think, two cardinal errors here. Professor Hall is evidently desiring to go through the process involved in the making of a
type 4 (agreed-entity description) definition, and (1) seems to assume
that that is the only proper kind of definition, either for "commonsense" theorists or for scientists; (2) seems to ignore the fact that the
process of verifiable fact-description which is so suitable where an
agreed entity is concerned is unsuitable where an unagreed entity is
concerned.
(1) As to the first error, it seems clear that scientists would generally tag their definitional process as type 3, or definition by stipulation.
40

Hall, "Concerning the Nature of Positive Law," 58 YA.LB L.

J. 545 (1949).
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Anyone working in an already developed science will be spending a
very small part of his time, indeed, in pursuing the taxonomic process
of description and classification of agreed entities. As for "common
sense," this is a strange authority to invoke for an abstract inquiry into
the comparative analysis of definitions.
The error in refusing to recognize any legitimate existence for a
type 3 or stipulation type of definition, and in applying to all scientific
definitions the factual test applicable to type 4 (i.e., does the description or classification correctly represent the facts?) means that Professor Hall is rejecting the "legal positivists' " definitions by a test which
is clearly inapplicable to them. As previously indicated, a definition of
the stipulation type (type 3) can be neither true nor false. It makes
no assertion of fact. It simply tells the reader exactly in what sense
the writer intends to use that symbol in the particular article or book.
It need carry no implication that matters not covered by the definition
are unworthy of study or are non-existent. Those other matters may be
given a different name and may be discussed now or at a different time.
One of the depressing things about jurisprudential literature is the recurring argument about the truth or falsity of a stipulation type of
definition (type 3). Some of the writers that Professor Hall attacks
(and they are for the most part nameless) may have been using this
type of definition. Assuming that Holmes is one of those that Professor
Hall has in mind, it might be shown that Holmes did not stick to his
definitions (he appears actually to have used "law" in more than one
sense), but this is different from objecting that he shouldn't have defined "law" in the way he did-from the point of view of "truth" (in the
sense of fidelity to fact) or of inclusiveness of subject-matter worthy of
study. If, as seems probable, he was using a stipulation type of definition, then the truth criterion is irrelevant; and certainly the range of his
subject matter was inclusive of policy, ethical, and historical reasons for
decisions, even if those matters didn't formally come within the term
"law" but were given different l::\bels. [If on the other hand, Holmes
was making a type 5 (unagreed-entity description) definition, it was
subject to the same criticism as Hall's quest for a definition-but it was
certainly no worse.] Pointing up the relative unimportance of Hall's
attack on the "Legal Positivists' " use of definitions is the fact that both
Hall and they have done valuable research and analysis in the domain
of both (a) the statutes and decisions and (b) the reasons for them,
and effects of them.
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That the point we have been making is not so difficult to grasp, but
difficult to retain, was impressed on me by an experience .in a jurisprudence class. Some few moments after the point had, I thought,
been driven home, concerning the lack of truth or falsity about a type
3 definition of "law," Student A had occasion to say something about
"ethics." His conception of ethics was immediately challenged by Student B who said Student A was really thinking of "morality" rather than
ethics. There ensued a bitter debate over the essential meanings of
morality and ethics, which might still be raging if the proceedings had
not been stopped by a reminder of the relevance of the previous point
on the definition of law. It was made clear a second time that we were
not interested in "inherent" meanings, that we could not make a type 4
definition since we had no agreed entity, that a type 5 was nothing
but a "phony" type 4, that we wanted to do more than just give examples as in typ~ 6. This left types 2 and 3. It was then pointed out
that if we were interested in the usage or dictionary-type of definition
(type #2) the sensible thing was to consult the dictionary. If on the
other hand we were stipulating meanings for the disputed words as a
matter of convenience and clarity in discussion, then it was irrelevant
to talk about their truth or falsity.
(2) There is another difficulty with Professor Hall's discussion.
Although he seems to be interested in going through _the process involved in making a type 4 (agreed-entity description) definition-truthfully describing what he calls the "core" of an "actual entity"-the discussion is clouded by the fact that he is talking not about an agreed
entity but about "some sort of existing entity" (p. 546) which is never
identifo.ed and to which, at one point, he seems to give a disembQdied
character.41 His feelings about this Something are being treated as
though they were the same as an agreed entity as to which a verifo,able,
factual description can be given. Describing the essential characteristics
of an unknown Something is a futile venture indeed. This will-o'-the-

4 1 "We are diverted by the fact that our laws are written. The written sentences tend to
dominate the thinking of bookmen and thus to emphasize the structure of law rather than its
actualities. What we must try to do is to think of positive law existing outside the books.
Imagine that a fire has consumed all the books and records-the positive law would nonetheless continue to exist." Hall, "Concerning the Nature of Positive Law," 58 YALE L. J. 545 at
564-5 (1949).
If this is to be given a non-mystical interpretation, one assumes that the agreed entity
which Professor Hall is postulating if he is to make a "truthful" definition of it, is the human
behavior and the human feelings, as to rightness and wrongness, which existed in the particular historical era being examined. But if that is an agreed entity, then Carl Becker and every
other clear-eyed historian who has confessed the non-existence of a science of history is an
incompetent. The entity is simply too vague to be the agreed subject of a truthful factdescription. All we can do is make more or less plausible guesses-with substantial guidance
from the agreed enti~es, e.g. the written evidence of behavior, thinking and fe~g.
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wisp-chasing de£inition, in others words, falls within type 5 ( unagreedentity description). And some of Professor Hall's language (e.g., identifying the de.6.nition problem with that to which the Aristotelian and
Scholastic views on "essence" were directed) suggests that he may also
be harboring the metaphysical or "private truth" notions involved in
. ).
type I ( "·m herent" meamngs
Take another example-this time not of the failure to discriminate
between types of de£initions, but of the failure to recognize that a problem is one of de.6.nition rather than anything else. You must have heard
the ancient query, "Does a tree make a noise, if it falls in the forest
and no one is there to hear it?" And you must have heard the difficulty '
resolved by a clari.6.cation of the uncertainty created by the word
'~noise." As soon as the word was de-fined, either in terms of vibration
of sound waves or the impact of such waves upon the ear, the problem
disappeared. I think the same disposition can be made of' this problem
presented by Professor Fuller: "Common sense tells me that there is a
clear distinction between a thing's being a steam engine and its being
a good steam engine. Yet if I have a dubious assemblage of wheels,
gears, and pistons before me and I ask, 'Is this a steam engine?' it is
clear that this inquiry overlaps mightily with the question: 'Is this a
good steam engine?' In the field of purposive human activity, which
includes both steam engines and the law, value and being are not t\vo
different things, but two aspects of an integral reality," and our energies should not be "dissipated in a fruitless attempt to separate the inseparable."42
Now if the two q:r,iestions are put in the form of de.6.nitional state· IS
· - - ," and"A goo d steam engme
· IS
· - -"
ments, "A steam engme
(so that after the blanks are filled in, it can be determined how "this"·
assemblage of wheels, etc. is to be classi.6.ed) it is clear that the de.6.nition can "separate the inseparable." "Steam engine" may be defined
in terms of physical parts alone, or of parts plus the end-result (e.g.,
the locomotion); or there might be added a requirement that the locomotion be possible at at least a speci.6.ed speed or at a maximum rate of
fuel consumption per mile. "Good steam engine" might be de.fined so
as to refer to certain requirements in addition to the minimal requirements listed for a "steam engine." If it were not thus carefully defined
to avoid confusion in terminology, then naturally one would not be
separating the two. But the fact that there are some common elements
doesn't mean that two are inseparable. There are some common elements in that a good steam engine, as de.fined, is still a steam engine
42 FULLER, THB LAw IN QDEsT oF hsBLP 11, 12 (1940).
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(just as a "good law" can still be a "law") and the function of a "steam
engine" may be duplicated in a "good steam engine," but on a different
level (just as, let us say, a "statute" may be said to be a legislative
command whereas a "good statute" is a fair legislative command). But
our definitions can separate the two concepts and should be permitted
to do so if we believe it useful to work with the two separate concepts.
The problem posed is a pseudo-problem. The entire universe is as
"integral" (to use Fuller's adjective) as the world of steam engines
(good, bad, and indifferent), yet as scientists, as law professors, as
everyday men of affairs, we are constantly and necessarily dealing with
parts-by abstracting, analyzing, defining. I think you will find elsewhere in Fuller's writings further illustration of an apparent subjection
to words as master rather than an assertion of mastery over them as
tools. 43
Now don't for a moment think that this criticism of Fuller and the
previous criticism of Hall (assuming the criticisms are well-founded)
mean that their work is unworthy of study. They have both made tremendous contributions, to substantive law theory and to jurisprudence.
The point is that even the best of us will sometimes let words get the
better of us. You too can find chinks in the armor of the titans.
Again, I have seen bitter arguments over the question "Do appellate
judges make the law or find it?" evaporate quickly once the precise
· wh·ICh the speak·er was usmg
· "malce" and "l'.-d"
sense In
m1
was made
43 After pointing out that the word "ownership" stands on the one ·hand, "as an ellipsis
for the considerations of policy that justify a court in granting a recovery in trespass" and on
the other hand, "as an elliptical description of the power relationship created by existing
rules," he says, "The concept of 'ownership' in other words, contains within itself the antinomy
of reason and fiat that lies at the heart of the whole legal order ••• it is not accurate to say
that these terms (such as "ownership") are ambiguous in the sense that they have two distinct
meanings. Rather, each of them stands for a relationship that can be viewed from two sides.
When we view it from the 'under' side, we are attempting to find compelling reasons for the
things that are done by courts in cases where these words are used. When we view it from
the 'upper' side, we are attempting to present the action of the court as a brute fact divorced
from the reasons that gave rise to it." (Emphasis supplied). Fuller, "Reason and Fiat in
Case Law,'' 59 HARV. L. RBv. 376 at 383-385 (1946).
Why, in Heaven's name, is it inaccurate to say that the word "ownership" is ambiguous
rather than that it stands for a "relationship that can be viewed from two sides"? Why not
carefully separate the two "viewings"-as Fuller indeed has done-and give different labels
to them, to avoid confusion? Apparently because of some metaphysical assumption-which
seems similar to the type #1, or "inherent meaning" variety of definition-that words "contain" some "integral reality" that must not be splintered by separate names. Apparently our
language must bow to and accommodate itself to this reality. I hesitate to ascribe such assumptions to Professor Fuller but I don't know how else to understand the quoted passage.
I have the same feeling about a curiously similar passage in Professor Hall's article
previously referred to. He too shows an awareness of the advantage of separate labels, but
then turns around and rejects them, primarily because that would "cloud thinking on the
subject" and would mean an ignoring of all the things that don't come under the ''law" label.
See Hall, "Concerning the Nature of Positive Law,'' 58 YALE L. J. 545 at 545-6 (1949).
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clear. Usually the adversaries would find either that they were in agreement or that the problem was one of degree, as to which a-convincingly
precise answer required knowledge that neither of them could then
present.
The point seems obvious, yet it is amazing how often controversies
will develop, among professors as well as others, which are sustained
largely or solely by ambiguity of language.44 You will have fun with
jurisprudential literature if you are on the look-out for this.
One more thing to watch for in the literature is the manufacture
and destruction of straw-men. Far too often you will witness the
demolition by Mr. X of Mr. Y's alleged position-when Mr. Y wouldn't
touch that position with a ten-foot pole. I am not going to document
this point in detail, but suggest as an example that you will find much
fruitless argument based on the demonstrably false assumption that
"legal realists" because of their definitions of "law," or otherwise, are
prevented from, ~r are not interested in, or are not in fact, spending
44 A classic battle that you should read for yourself is between Yntema and M. R. Cohen,
a large part of which is concerned with the issue of the "reality of universals"-i.e., whether
universal propositions "exist" in the "external world" as the philosophical realists (as opposed
to nominalists) claimed. Cohen gave belated recognition, near the end of his article, to the
"theoretic" possibility that definitions of such terms as "existence" and "external" would show
agreement between the adversaries to the effect that universals do exist outside the mind but in
a different sense from that in which particulars exist. ["Philosophy and Legal Science," 32
CoL. L. REv. 1103, 1111 (1932)]. But he did not give the point any central importance,
apparently because "the usual implicit assumption, that verbal differences or differences of
definition are of no importance, must be rejected as superficial and as belied -by the facts of
history." On the contrary, the point is not that differences of definition have not been of
importance in history-they have been of tremendous importance, if only in the respect that
when not made explicit (or when the type of definition was not understood for what it was)
they have contributed mightily to confusion and enormously wasteful controversies. Such
controversies are logically "unimportant" though of course they are historically important.
Incidentally, I don't think that in the case of this particular controversy, a careful use of
definitions would have revealed agreement between philosophical realists and their critics.
At least some of those opposed to the realists (perhaps these should be called logical empiricists rather than nominalists), while agreeing that a general principle "exists" in some sense
different from that in which a particular is said to exist, would certainly disagree that the
principle "exists" in the same sense that the philosophical realists would say it did. For they
would not accept the metaphysical assumption that the true principle or rule is imbedded in
some "underlying reality." They would simply refuse to deal with such ideas as "inner
essence of things," "underlying reality," etc. Theirs is a more rigid application of the scientific standards of observation and experience. Universals are useful, humanly constructed
instruments for accomplishing certain objectives, e.g., for predicting consequences, which
can then be subjected to empirical verification. The world of "essences" and "realities" is
not amenable to the chosen standards of this group. One (misleading) way in which they
put their position is that such ideas are "meaningless." Note that while Cohen in his controversy with Yntema, supra, refers (at p. 1109) to the true universal as being imbedded in the
"true nature of things," the phrase has a probably unintended metaphysical flavor. For this
is the same Cohen who referred to the word "reality" as an "emotional affiatus," and indicated
by bis subsequent discussion that by such phrases as "existence" of universals in the "true
nature of things" he was saying little more than that true universals are verifiable by reference
to nature. Cohen, "The Place of Logic in the Law,'' 29 HAnv. L. REv. 622 at 629 (1916).
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time on the problem of what the law ought to be ( or are unaware tl1at
judges' decision embodies some "ought"Yr; as well as other misrepresentations of the "realist" position.40
IV
Now, if_you will actually undertake the study of jurisprudence on
your own, as you indicated, you are going to wonder about what materials· to use. And if you take tl1e course in school you will be puzzled
and curious about the relevance of some of the materials used. Perhaps I can satisfy both of these cu:r;iosities by outlining the utilities of
various types of materials.
·
(I) There is, first of all, the kind of materials that are designed to
cultivate word-consciousness. Studying the theory of definitions, such
as I· outlined above, falls within this class. Additional developers of
word-consciousness could be found in the literature of linguistic anthropology, which teaches the startling lesson that our particular language
system itself helps to mold our ways of thinking and our ways of interpreting the world.47 Still another, and very important source is the
literature which has concerned itself with legal language habits. In
addition to Glanville Williams' recent articles,48 there are some good
examples of this literature in chapter eleven of Hall's Readings in Jurisprudence (such as the lecture of Walter Wheeler Cook which I referred to before,49 Max Radin's restatement of the Hohfeldian analysis
45 See e.g. Kantorowicz, "Some Rationalism About Realism," 43 YALE L. J. 1240 (1934);
FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF lTsELF (1940) [in connection with which, see the vigorous
rebuttal on the specific point here involved, in McDougal, "Fuller v. The American Legal
Realists: An Intervention," 50 YALE L. J. 827, esp. 834-6 (1941)); M. R. Cohen, "A Critical
Sketch of Legal Philosophy in America," in 2 LAw, A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 266, 309
(1937) and "Philosophy and Legal Science," 32 CoL. L. REv. 1103, 1117 et seq. (1932).
For rebuttal material, in addition to the McDougal article, supra note 45, see GARLAN,
UGAL REALISM AND JUSTICE (1941).
40 See the various overstatements of bis adversaries' position, by Pound in "The Call
For a Realist Jurisprudence," 44 HARv. L. REv. 697 (1931), shown to be overstatements by
Llewellyn's reply in "Some Realb"lll About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound," 44 HARV.
L. REv. 1222 (1931), and I think by any objective reader's reference back to the original
Llewellyn article to which Pouna · had responded, "A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next
Step," 30 CoL. L. REv. 431 (1930).
Note also the excesses attributed by Adler to the legal realists (including the assertion
that th1:y think it needless to pay attention to the logical relations between legal propositions)
and the demonstration by Cook of the extremity of Adler's characterizations, in "Law and
the Modem Mind: a Symposium," 31 CoL. L. REv. 91-115 (1931).
47 See e.g. KLuCKHOHN, MmROR FOR MAN 162-167 (1949); LEE, THE LANGUAGE OF
WISDOM AND FoLLY 247-285 (1949); Whorf, "Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior
to Language," in ·SPIER, HALLOWELL AND NEWMAN, LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND PERSONALITY 75-93 (1941).
48 See Williams, "Language and the Law," 61 L. Q. REv. 71-86, 179-95, 293-303, 384-406 (1945); 62 L. Q. REv. 387-406 (1946).
·
49 Cook, ''The Utility of Jurisprudence in the Solution of Legal Problems," in 5 LEcTURES ON LEGAL ToPics, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 337 (1924).
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of legal terminology) and various articles.r;o I'd also suggest, in this
connection, a sampling of Bonbright's Valuation of Property for a
beautiful demonstration of the chamelon qualities of the "value" concept at the hands of courts. One· thinks also of some of Llewellyn's
studies in the law of sales. In f~ct any of the masters of our profession
seems sooner or later to have concerned himself with basic linguistic
difficulties.
(2) Related to word-consciousness is an awareness of the role of
logical manipulation of legal propositions in the j"udicial process. Here
again Hall's Readings in Jurisprudence, especially in chapters nine and
thirteen, and Truesch's profuse illustrations of the role of the syllogism
in legal thinking as reproduced in Hall's chapter twelve, would help
develop this awareness.51 So far, then, we have been dealing with
materials which have the utility of sharpening the lawyers' basic tools.
(3) Many jurisprudence courses will practically ignore No. I
above, and give not much attention to No. 2. Their main focus is on
a study of the various "schools" of jurisprudence, which go under
·
· 1u d·mg "anaIynca,
· I " "natural 1aw," "h·1storica,
· l " "sovanous
names me
cic;>logical," "realist" and a few others. My own preference is-to telescope
this field, though including enough of it to show the leading ideas
within each "school." For this purpose suitable extracts can be made
from Part One of Hall's Readings in Jurisprudence. While the classification into "schools" does not give clean-cut groupings, it is well that
you be acquainted with these rather traditional classifications, since
(a) it enables you to understand what writers are referring to when,
as is so often true, they use these common labels expecting the reader
to know what men are being referred to (see e.g., Hall's reference to
the "legal positivists" in the above discussion); (b) it reveals the
importance of a theory of definitions such as that above outlined,
because much of the disputation which divides these schools will be
found to revolve around definitions; (c) it will help teach the salutary
lesson that "those who see law as only this or only that see but nar60 See e.g. Shartel, ''Meanings of Possession," 16 Mnm. L. REv. 611 (1932); Merrill,
"Anatomy of Notice," 3 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 417 (1936); Chafee, "The Disorderly Conduct
of Words," 41 CoL, L. REv. 381 (1941); Cook, "'Immovables' and the 'Law' of the 'Situs':
A Study in the Ambiguity of Legal Terminology,'' 52 HARv. L. REv. 1246 (1939); and
"'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws,'' 42 YALE L. J. 333 (1933).
61 Levi's recent AN lNTRoouCTION To LEGAL REASONING (1949) and Morris' How
LAWYERS THINK (1937) would also be helpful, as would Julius Stone's perceptive, though I
think unnecessarily complicated, treatment of ''Fallacies of Logical Form in Legal Reasoning''
in THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION oP J;.Aw, c. VII (1946).
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rowly"; that "we are ... prone to over-claim, over-simplify, and overgeneralize."52
( 4) The telescoping that I suggest of the study of "schools" is to
make room not only for No. I and No. 2 above, but also for certain
other matters. You should be made aware· of the studies aimed at
seeing law as a "going institution," i.e., from the standpoint of a
scientific cultural anthropologist interested in observing the "law-ways"
of the "law-men" in the performance, within the _particular culture, of
the various "law-jobs" (e.g., disposition of the "trouble-case"; channeling and re-channeling of. "conduct, habit and expectation"; allotment
and regulation of the authoritative "say"; "organizing and directing
the team . . . to elicit positive drive, . . . to produce an unfolding of
possibility, of vision, of health"; developing, maintaining and improving the craft-skills of the law-men)-jobs whose "ideal aspects" are
"efficiency of operation" and "realization of man's aspirations." The
phrases are those of Llewellyn who has done much to show the importance of this type of viewing.53 But such scientific studies of
human behavior ( with a "law-stuff" focus) are, as Llewellyn recognizes,
still in their infancy. 154 The job here is for the professional socio-legal
scientist; the law-school student of jurisprudence can do little more
than note the analysis, appreciate the inadequacy of existing knowledge
and see the need for unending search.
But the "little more" that I have in mind is in some ways quite
big. While the law school student cannot at this stage of our knowledge
know how everything "goes around" in the "law-stuff" and why it
does, and how therefore the desired results can be socially engineered,
there are certain related matters he can study with great profit. (I)
5 2 Powell,

in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 278-280 (1941); and see in this connection,

F. S. Cohen, "Field Theory and Judicial Logic," 59 YALE L. J. 238 at 266-272 (1950).
53 See Llewellyn, "The Theory of Legal Science,'' 20 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1941); his contn'bution to MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 183-197 (1941); and his article, "Law and the Social
Sciences-Especially Sociology,'' 62 HARv, L. REv. 1286 '(1949). Other useful papers on
the "Sociology of Law" can be found in part three of Hall's READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE,
This aspect, together with materials focussed on the notion of "control" through law, is
learnedly treated in part III of STONE, PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAw (1946). See also
the pioneering analysis of the role of legal institutional agencies in our history in HtmST,
GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW (1950).
54 One rough indication of this is to read Stuart Chase's recent attempt, in the PnoPBR
STUDY OF MAmaND (1948), to summarize the wisdom of the social sciences. The wisdom is
shockingly meagre. I am certain that some nuggets of wisdom lie buried in learned, technical journals whose library-stack dust was undisturbed by Chase [in addition to some more
available studies, see, e.g., the experimental findings cited in SHERIF, OUTLINE OF SoCIAL
PsYCHOLOGY (1948)] but the point is that no theoretical social science which would usefully coordinate these isolated bits of learning seems to have been accessible to as relatively
skilled a researcher as he is (no matter what be his status as a theoretician).
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Since, in the here and now, some engineering is always occurringhowever haphazard, unscientific or unconscious it may be-it is important to try to bring out into the open the goals toward which this
blundering engineering seems to be directed. Judges, legislators and
administrators could then operate more intelligently. (2) Such of the
social studies as have arrived at widely accepted conclusions should
be utilized for the help they can give to more intelligent engineering.
It is here that I see the great value of Simpson and Stone's recent
readings on Law and Society-not so much on the second point as on
the first. 1515 This three-volume treatise, in the authors' words, "attempts
to do what has been so much talked about-correlate law with the social
sciences-and in the only way this can be accomplished in the present
state of our social knowledge, by a comparative and historical study
which is neither dilettante nor antiquarian, but which is directed
ultimately and squarely to the central and pressing problems of the law
in present day civilization."56
On a scale never before attempted, the work cuts across the traditional categories-domestic relations, constitutional law, contracts,
property, torts, corporations, labor law, trade regulation, legislation,
administr~tive law-and organizes some of their major holdings around
key "interests," around those existing claims, desires, or values157 which
the law appears to be aimed at effectuating ( whether it was consciously
so aimed, or successful in actually effectuating them are other questions). The great utility of such analysis for you is not only that it
will light up and integrate a good deal of your substantive law courses,
but it will help make you and other students, and ultimately, judges,
legislators and administrators, think in terms of the ends or policies
which law is serving.158 We still tend not to think in those terms-in
spite of the re-orientation in a few recent casebooks, and the curricular
boldness of the Yale Law School.
, In this interest-analysis (or in "policy" analysis, or other differently
worded but similarly oriented approaches) there are, to be sure, ambiguities and other difficulties. The statements of the interests are
rarely phrased concretely enough to mean the same thing to practically
155 I have indicated the limited value of the work on the second point, in addition to some
other characteristics of the work, in a book review in 2 J. LEGAL Enuc. 389 (1950).
liG SIMPSON AND STONE, LAW AND SocmTY, Preface x (1948).
57 See note 59 infra and text to which it is appended.
158 For a text discussion of the interest-analysis, as distinct from cases and other readings,
see not only the introductory notes to the major subdivisons of SIMPSON AND STONE, LAW
AND SocmTY (1948), ·but SToNE, PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAw 507-646 (1946). See
also the Pound articles cited supra note 12.
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all men. There is further, the problem of determining what are all
the _various interests from which to choose, as well as the weighing and
choosing between conflicting interests, and also the matter of guessing
whether the particular legal action will in fact effectuate one or the
other interest. But the focus-which Holmes long ago insisted was
necessary-is sound. It is no less sound than the proposition that the
law is a means to an end. I don't mean by what I have said that a
study of the ends of law should confine itself to the interests themselves. Theories of justice are not usually formulated in terms of the
effectuation of particular interests. In other words there should be
supplementation in this connection, by the views of various· ethical
thinkers50 -some of whom will have already been met in the summary
treatment of the "schools" of jurisprud~nce. Along with the interestanalysis in Simpson and Stone's second volume, I'd prescribe their
materials on the analysis of the "machinery of social control"-the
legislative, administrative and judicial process00-though I think some
supplementation would be desirable.01 Obviously a study of ends i~
benefited by a survey of the basic facts and problems involved in the
machinery which constitutes the means.
To the extent that your jurisprudence course uses the types of
materials I have described, you will, by means of the foregoing I hope,
have come to appreciate their relevance. So too if you take up jurisprudence on your own, as you have threatened to do, you will know
the what and why of the materials I'd prescribe. Good luck.
As Ever,

S.M.
liO See e.g. SToNS, THI! PnoVINCB AND FUNCTION oF LAw 215-388 (1946), oi: equivalent extracts from part one of HALL, READINGS IN JurusPRUDENCB (1938); M. R. CoHEN,
REAsoN AND LAW 84-104, 178-181 (1950); CAHN, THI! SBNSB OF lNJasncB (1949).
For critical analysis of Roscoe Pound's insufficient separation of his theory of interests
from his theory of justice, and his derivation of "jural postulates" from the interests, see
STONE, supra, at 355-368. See also Patterson, "Pound's Theory of Social Interests," in INTBRPRBTATIONS oF MonBRN LBGAL PmLosoPHIBs, Essays in Honor of Roscoe Pound, 558
(1947).
60 Some less elaborate readings on the legislative and judicial process are in chapters 23
and 24 of Hall's READINGS IN 'JurusPRUDENCB,
61 Thus, for instance, on the judicial process, rd include at least extracts from such
expositions as FRANK, CoURTS ON TRIAL (1949): Oliphant, "A Return to Stare Decisis,"
6 AM. L. SCHOOL Rsv. 215 (1928); Goodhart, "Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a
Case," 40 YALB L. J. 161 (1930); Llewellyn's remarks in symposium, "The Status of the
Rule. of Judicial Precedent," 14 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 208-220, 343-355 (1940); and his
"The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract," 47 YALB L. J. 1243 (1938); Douglas,
"Stare Decisis," 49 CoL. L. REv. ·735 (1949); F. S. Cohen, "Field Theory and Judicial
Logic," 59 YALB L. J. 238 (1950); and where the statutory construction problem is central,
the recent valuable "A Symposium on Statutory Construction," 3 V AND. L. REv. 365 et seq.
(1950) and some of the materials cited therein.

